DPIA Support for Practices
Information to help a dental practice complete its own data protection impact assessment for Unpack. It sets out how the service actually works, so a practice or DPO can lift the supplier facts straight into their assessment.
The practice, as controller, owns and approves its own DPIA. This page is supplier input, not a completed DPIA and not legal advice. Azimuth Associates LTD t/a Unpack does not sign off or approve a practice’s DPIA.
Unpack’s own, separate supplier-side DPIA (working assessment, not approved) sets out our risk register and open supplier questions.
1. Describe the processing
Unpack is a communication, coaching, reflection, transcription and analysis service used by practices and individual professionals.
- Where a practice chooses to, patient conversations can be recorded in the app or imported. Audio is transcribed, the transcript is analysed to produce structured coaching and reflection outputs, and those outputs build a longitudinal history used for review and preparation.
- Unpack is designed for documentation, retrieval of previously discussed information, communication analysis and professional development. It is not intended to diagnose, prevent, monitor, predict, prognose, treat or alleviate disease or injury; determine patient-specific treatment suitability; or recommend patient-specific treatment, medication, investigation, dosage or referral. Clinical decisions remain with the treating clinician, and Unpack does not replace clinical record-keeping.
- Roles: the practice is normally the Controller for practice-directed patient and staff content; Azimuth Associates LTD t/a Unpack acts as Processor under the Data Processing Agreement. Azimuth Associates LTD is a separate controller for account, administrative, billing, security and legal-compliance data, as set out in the Privacy Policy.
2. Data and people involved
People:
- patients and other conversation participants where a practice records or imports content;
- practice staff, clinicians and other Unpack users;
- coaches, appraisers and meeting participants where those features are used.
Data:
- audio recordings and imported audio;
- transcripts and cleaned transcripts;
- health and clinical information where it appears in conversation content — special-category data;
- account, profile and contact data; practice membership and role data;
- generated analyses, behavioural and patient-experience observations, coaching outputs;
- uploaded files and diary images;
- technical, authentication, application and administrative audit logs;
- push notification device tokens.
3. Purpose and necessity
The purposes the service is built for are reflection on communication, coaching, improving how conversations go, and preparation informed by history.
The practice must articulate its own specific purpose, and its own assessment of necessity and proportionality. A generic “to improve communication” is unlikely to be enough on its own.
Recording in Unpack is not necessary for the delivery of dental care. Patient care can continue perfectly well without any conversation being recorded, and that should be reflected honestly in the necessity assessment.
4. Data flow
- A user starts a recording in Unpack on their device, or content arrives through an import or an inbound integration the practice has set up itself.
- Audio and content are received by the Unpack application, which is built and hosted on the Lovable platform.
- Audio, transcripts, accounts and application records are stored in Supabase, which also provides authentication and file storage.
- Audio is sent through the Lovable AI Gateway to OpenAI for speech-to-text transcription.
- The resulting transcript is stored in Supabase.
- Transcript and conversation text are sent through the Lovable AI Gateway to Google Gemini models for analysis, structuring and coaching outputs.
- Generated outputs are stored alongside the session or meeting they belong to.
- Authorised users — the account holder, and coaches or practice roles where the practice has granted access — read that content through the application, subject to authentication and row-level access policies.
- Source audio is deleted after successful processing. Failed-audio expiry is designed for seven days, but the scheduled sweep was missing at audit; verified remediation remains outstanding. Other content is removed by user deletion or by account purge, according to the retention lifecycle.
Firebase Cloud Messaging is used only for delivering push notifications to registered devices. It receives device tokens and the notification content itself — titles and short summaries — and is not part of the transcription or analysis chain. Where a notification summary is generated from content, that summary text passes through the notification delivery chain.
Full provider detail is in the Subprocessor Register.
5. International transfers
We do not claim UK-only hosting. What we state is the architecture — which providers are used and for what. The processing region of each provider, and the transfer mechanism that applies to it, sit with those providers and are not verified directly by us.
- Provider-level terms have been located for our main providers, including transfer mechanisms based on the EU standard contractual clauses as amended by the UK Addendum.
- Whether those mechanisms flow through to Azimuth Associates LTD’s actual arrangement — in particular where model calls are made through the Lovable AI Gateway rather than under a direct account with the model provider — is not verified directly by us.
- The Unpack account is currently on the Lovable Pro plan. Lovable states that DPA inclusion applies to Business or Enterprise plans, and the model-training opt-out available on Business is not available to this Pro account. Unpack does not submit content for the purpose of training models, but no contractual training exclusion or formal DPA is claimed on this plan. Written clarification confirms that identifiable patient recordings and transcripts are restricted under all standard Lovable plans, including Business. Expansion remains on hold pending a negotiated exception or independently contracted processing and legal review; practice approval cannot override this restriction.
- The Supabase database, authentication and file storage region has been verified as AWS
eu-central-1(Frankfurt, Germany). - The processing locations used by the Lovable AI Gateway and the downstream model providers are determined by those providers and are not verified directly by us. No UK-only claim is made for that part of the chain.
The current position for each provider is recorded in the Subprocessor Register. A practice should treat those outstanding items as an open risk to accept or challenge.
6. Retention
- Stored audio: deleted as soon as processing has completed successfully; failed or orphaned audio has a designed seven-day expiry, but the scheduled sweep was missing at audit. Verified remediation remains outstanding; no seven-day guarantee is made.
- Account deletion: a 30-day grace period, after which the account and its content are purged. Implemented.
- Transcripts, analyses and history: kept while the account is active, until deleted by the user or removed on purge.
- Provider backups and provider log rotation periods are set by those providers and are not verified directly by us.
- Admin audit records and account-deletion audit records are retained with no expiry set.
Full detail is in the Retention Schedule.
7. Security controls
- Authenticated access, with row-level access policies enforced in the database.
- Encryption of data in transit using TLS; encryption at rest provided by the platform providers.
- Secrets held and used server-side, not in the client application.
- Multi-factor authentication enforced for administrative accounts.
- Privileged support access is MFA-gated, requires a stated reason, and is written to a tamper-resistant admin audit log that no client can write to or amend.
- Deletion controls for users, plus the audio sweep and account purge lifecycle.
- Consent confirmation gate before recording; no background listening.
- Optional on-device biometric lock in the iOS app.
Stated limitations. There is no application-level or end-to-end encryption of transcripts beyond the encryption provided by the platform providers; our administrators can technically access stored content. We hold no ISO 27001, Cyber Essentials or SOC 2 certification, and we have not had an independent penetration test. We say so plainly rather than implying assurance we do not have.
Full detail is in the Security & technical measures statement.
8. Potential risks for the practice to assess
These are prompts, not a scored risk assessment. We deliberately do not assign probability or severity ratings — that is the controller’s judgement for its own setting.
Recording a patient without adequate transparency or authority
Existing Unpack control: Recording is always started deliberately by a user; a consent confirmation gate prompts before recording starts; there is no background listening.
Practice action / decision: Decide and document how patients are told, agree local wording, train the team and audit that it happens.
Processing special-category health data without a correct Article 9 condition
Existing Unpack control: None. Unpack cannot determine this. Documentation flags that transcripts commonly contain health data.
Practice action / decision: Identify and record the Article 9 condition, with advice; decide whether the intended use is supportable at all.
Collecting more conversation content than is necessary
Existing Unpack control: Recording is per-session and user-initiated; users can delete sessions and transcripts.
Practice action / decision: Define which conversations may be recorded, and set an internal rule for stopping and deleting.
Unauthorised access by another user, coach or practice member, or poor offboarding
Existing Unpack control: Authentication, row-level access policies scoped to the user and practice role, MFA-gated privileged support access with audit logging.
Practice action / decision: Decide who gets which role, review the list periodically, and remove access promptly when someone leaves.
Patient misunderstanding, or feeling pressured into agreeing
Existing Unpack control: Nothing technical prevents this; guidance sets out refusal handling.
Practice action / decision: Train the team that refusal is normal and free of consequence; give patients an easy way to object later.
Transcript inaccuracy, or AI output being treated as clinical truth
Existing Unpack control: Outputs support documentation, communication analysis and professional development; draft notes require clinician review and Unpack is not the required clinical record.
Practice action / decision: Instruct clinicians not to rely on Unpack output for clinical decisions or record-keeping, and keep the clinical record separately.
International transfer or supplier contract uncertainty
Existing Unpack control: Subprocessor register published, with provider-level terms and outstanding items separated rather than glossed over.
Practice action / decision: Review the register, decide whether the current position is acceptable, and record that decision or hold the rollout.
Supplier contractual and model-training position on the current platform plan
Existing Unpack control: The Unpack account is on the Lovable Pro plan. Lovable states that DPA inclusion applies to Business or Enterprise plans, and the model-training opt-out available on Business is not available to this Pro account. Unpack does not submit content for the purpose of training models, but no contractual training exclusion is claimed on this plan.
Practice action / decision: Decide whether this open contractual position is acceptable for the content the practice intends to process, particularly patient special-category data, and record that decision or defer rollout.
Data retained longer than necessary
Existing Unpack control: Source audio deletion on successful processing; user deletion controls; account purge lifecycle. The designed seven-day failure sweep was missing at audit; remediation remains outstanding.
Practice action / decision: Set an internal rule for deleting transcripts you no longer need.
Device or account compromise
Existing Unpack control: Authenticated access; optional on-device biometric lock in the iOS app; server-side handling of secrets.
Practice action / decision: Require device passcodes, discourage shared logins, and decide your own password and device standards.
Personal data breach, service outage or data loss
Existing Unpack control: Provider-managed infrastructure and routine provider backups; processor breach-notification obligations in the DPA.
Practice action / decision: Define your own breach route and 72-hour reporting process, and name who is responsible.
Staff perceiving recording as workplace surveillance
Existing Unpack control: No background recording; recordings are user-initiated and visible.
Practice action / decision: Write and consult on a staff recording policy; be explicit that it is not performance monitoring.
Failure to maintain the required clinical record separately
Existing Unpack control: Unpack is documented as not being the clinical record.
Practice action / decision: Confirm your clinical record-keeping process is unchanged and that nothing relies on Unpack.
| Risk to consider | Existing Unpack control | Practice action / decision |
|---|---|---|
| Recording a patient without adequate transparency or authority | Recording is always started deliberately by a user; a consent confirmation gate prompts before recording starts; there is no background listening. | Decide and document how patients are told, agree local wording, train the team and audit that it happens. |
| Processing special-category health data without a correct Article 9 condition | None. Unpack cannot determine this. Documentation flags that transcripts commonly contain health data. | Identify and record the Article 9 condition, with advice; decide whether the intended use is supportable at all. |
| Collecting more conversation content than is necessary | Recording is per-session and user-initiated; users can delete sessions and transcripts. | Define which conversations may be recorded, and set an internal rule for stopping and deleting. |
| Unauthorised access by another user, coach or practice member, or poor offboarding | Authentication, row-level access policies scoped to the user and practice role, MFA-gated privileged support access with audit logging. | Decide who gets which role, review the list periodically, and remove access promptly when someone leaves. |
| Patient misunderstanding, or feeling pressured into agreeing | Nothing technical prevents this; guidance sets out refusal handling. | Train the team that refusal is normal and free of consequence; give patients an easy way to object later. |
| Transcript inaccuracy, or AI output being treated as clinical truth | Outputs support documentation, communication analysis and professional development; draft notes require clinician review and Unpack is not the required clinical record. | Instruct clinicians not to rely on Unpack output for clinical decisions or record-keeping, and keep the clinical record separately. |
| International transfer or supplier contract uncertainty | Subprocessor register published, with provider-level terms and outstanding items separated rather than glossed over. | Review the register, decide whether the current position is acceptable, and record that decision or hold the rollout. |
| Supplier contractual and model-training position on the current platform plan | The Unpack account is on the Lovable Pro plan. Lovable states that DPA inclusion applies to Business or Enterprise plans, and the model-training opt-out available on Business is not available to this Pro account. Unpack does not submit content for the purpose of training models, but no contractual training exclusion is claimed on this plan. | Decide whether this open contractual position is acceptable for the content the practice intends to process, particularly patient special-category data, and record that decision or defer rollout. |
| Data retained longer than necessary | Source audio deletion on successful processing; user deletion controls; account purge lifecycle. The designed seven-day failure sweep was missing at audit; remediation remains outstanding. | Set an internal rule for deleting transcripts you no longer need. |
| Device or account compromise | Authenticated access; optional on-device biometric lock in the iOS app; server-side handling of secrets. | Require device passcodes, discourage shared logins, and decide your own password and device standards. |
| Personal data breach, service outage or data loss | Provider-managed infrastructure and routine provider backups; processor breach-notification obligations in the DPA. | Define your own breach route and 72-hour reporting process, and name who is responsible. |
| Staff perceiving recording as workplace surveillance | No background recording; recordings are user-initiated and visible. | Write and consult on a staff recording policy; be explicit that it is not performance monitoring. |
| Failure to maintain the required clinical record separately | Unpack is documented as not being the clinical record. | Confirm your clinical record-keeping process is unchanged and that nothing relies on Unpack. |
9. Questions the practice must answer before approval
- What is our Article 6 lawful basis for recording and processing this content?
- What is our Article 9 condition for the health data in patient transcripts?
- What exactly is the purpose, stated in a sentence we would be comfortable showing a patient?
- Is recording necessary for that purpose, and is it proportionate?
- Is there a less intrusive alternative that would achieve enough of the benefit?
- How will patients and staff be told, and where is that written down?
- How does a patient decline, and how do we ensure refusal carries no disadvantage?
- Who will have access, under what role, and how is access removed?
- How long will we keep transcripts, analyses and history, and who enforces that?
- How will we handle access, erasure, objection and rectification requests?
- Do we accept the supplier position, including the outstanding transfer and contractual items in the subprocessor register?
- What is our incident and breach process, and who owns it?
- Have we consulted our DPO or data-protection adviser, and recorded their view?
- Is the residual risk high enough that prior consultation with the ICO is required before we proceed?
10. Supplier information available from Unpack
- Data Processing Agreement — published in full for your legal review.
- Subprocessor Register.
- Retention Schedule.
- Security & technical measures.
- Patient Recording Guidance.
- Privacy Policy.
Operator: Azimuth Associates LTD t/a Unpack, Francis House, Coventry Road, Burbage, Leicestershire LE10 2HL. Registered with the Information Commissioner’s Office, registration number ZB497244. ICO registration is part of our data-protection governance; it is not a certification of GDPR compliance.
11. DPIA sign-off (for the practice to complete)
These sections are for the practice’s own record. Azimuth Associates LTD t/a Unpack does not sign, approve or countersign a practice DPIA.
Practice / controller (owner of this DPIA)
______________________________
DPO or data-protection adviser consulted
______________________________
Summary of risks identified and mitigations applied
______________________________
Residual risk accepted by
______________________________
Date of approval
______________________________
Review date
______________________________